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Abstract
Here I explore a novel no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics which combines
aspects of two familiar and well-developed alternatives, Bohmian mechanics and the many-
worlds interpretation. Despite reproducing the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics,
the theory looks surprisingly classical. All there is at the fundamental level are particles
interacting via Newtonian forces. There is no wave function. However, there are many
worlds.
1 Introduction
On the face of it, quantum physics is nothing like classical physics. Despite its oddity, work
in the foundations of quantum theory has provided some palatable ways of understanding this
strange quantum realm. Most of our best theories take that story to include the existence
of a very non-classical entity: the wave function. Here I offer an alternative which combines
elements of Bohmian mechanics and the many-worlds interpretation to form a theory in which
there is no wave function. According to this theory, all there is at the fundamental level are
particles interacting via Newtonian forces. In this sense, the theory is classical. However, it is
still undeniably strange as it posits the existence of a large but finite collection of worlds, each
completely and utterly real. When an experiment is conducted, every result with appreciable
Born Rule probability does actually occur in one of these worlds. Unlike the many worlds of the
many-worlds interpretation, these worlds are fundamental, not emergent; they are interacting,
not causally isolated; and they never branch. In each of these worlds, particles follow well-defined
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trajectories and move as if they were being guided by a wave function in the familiar Bohmian
way.
In this paper I will not attempt to argue that this theory is unequivocally superior to its
competitors. Instead, I would like to establish it as a surprisingly successful alternative which
deserves attention and development, hopefully one day meriting inclusion among the list of
promising realist responses to the measurement problem.
In §2, I briefly review why quantum mechanics is in need of a more precise formulation and
discuss two no-collapse theories: the many-worlds interpretation and Bohmian mechanics. I then
go on to offer a rather unlikable variant of Bohmian mechanics which adds to the standard story
a multitude of worlds all guided by the same wave function. This theory is useful as a stepping
stone on the way to Newtonian QM. Newtonian QM is then introduced. As soon as Newtonian
QM is on the table, §5 & 6 present one of the most significant costs associated with the theory:
the space of states must be restricted if the theory is to recover the experimental predictions of
quantum mechanics. In §7, 8, & 9, I discuss the advantages of this new theory over Everettian
and Bohmian quantum mechanics in explaining the connection between the squared amplitude
of the wave function and probability. In §10, I consider the possibility of modifying the theory
so that it describes a continuous infinity of worlds instead of a finite collection, concluding that
such a modification would be inadvisable. In §11, I propose two options for the fundamental
ontology of Newtonian QM. In §12, I use Newtonian QM to explain the way the wave function
transforms under time reversal and Galilean boosts. Spin is then discussed in §13.
Some limitations of the theory presented here are worth stating up front. First, just as
hydrodynamics relies on approximating a discrete collection of particles as a continuum, in its
current form this theory must treat the discrete collection of worlds as a continuum. As this
is merely an approximation, empirical equivalence with standard quantum mechanics is likely
only approximate (§5). Second, one must impose a significant restriction on the space of states
if the predictions of QM are to be reproduced (the Quantization Condition, §6). Third, I will
not discuss extending the theory to handle multiple particles with spin or relativistic quantum
physics.
Newtonian QM is a realist version of quantum mechanics based on the theory’s hydrodynamic
formulation (originally due to Madelung, 1927). For recent and relevant discussions of quantum
hydrodynamics, see Wyatt (2005); Holland (2005). An approach much like Newtonian QM was
independently arrived at by Hall et al. (2014). Newtonian QM is somewhat similar to Bo¨strom’s
(2012) metaworld theory1 and the proposal in Tipler (2006). Related ideas about how to remove
the wave function are explored in Poirier (2010); Schiff & Poirier (2012), including a suggestion
of many worlds.
1The key difference with Newtonian QM being that Bo¨strom’s theory does not as thoroughly excise the wave
function (the dynamics being given by (1) not (16)).
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To avoid confusion, throughout the paper I’ll use “universe” to denote the entirety of reality,
what philosophers call “the actual world” and what in these contexts is sometimes called the
“multiverse,” reserving “world” for the many worlds of quantum mechanics.
2 The Measurement Problem
If the state of the universe is given by a wave function and that wave function always evolves
in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation, then quantum measurements will typically not
have single definite outcomes. Actual measurements of quantum systems performed in physics
laboratories do seem to yield just one result. This, in brief, is the measurement problem. There
are various ways of responding.
According to Everettian quantum mechanics, a.k.a. the many-worlds interpretation, the wave
function Ψ is all there is. The evolution of the wave function is always given by the Schro¨dinger
equation,
i~
∂
∂t
Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) =
(∑
k
−~2
2mk
∇2k + V ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t)
)
Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) , (1)
where Ψ is a function of particle configuration ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ...) and time t, mk is the mass of particle
k, ∇2k is the Laplacian with respect to #–x k, and V is the classical potential energy of particle con-
figuration ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ...) at t. When an observer performs a quantum measurement, the universal
wave function enters a superposition of the observer seeing each possible outcome. This is not to
be understood as one observer seeing many outcomes, but as many observers each seeing a single
outcome. Thus, the theory is not obviously inconsistent with our experience of measurements
appearing to have unique outcomes. According to Everettian quantum mechanics, there is noth-
ing more than the wave function and therefore things like humans, measuring devices, and cats
must be understood as being somehow composed of or arising out of wave function. (Wallace,
2003, 2012 takes these things to be patterns or structures in the universal wave function.) To
summarize, here is what the Everettian QM says that there is (the ontology) and how it evolves
in time (the dynamical laws).
Ontology: (I) universal wave function Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
Law: (I) Schro¨dinger equation (1)
A second option in responding to the measurement problem is to expand the ontology so that
the universe contains both a wave function evolving according to (1) and particles with definite
locations. The time-dependent position of particle k can be written as #–x k(t) and its velocity as
#–v k(t). The wave function pushes particles around by a specified law,
#–v k(t) =
~
mk
Im
[
#–∇kΨ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t)
Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
]
. (2)
3
Experiments are guaranteed to have unique outcomes because humans and their scientific instru-
ments are made of particles (not wave function). These particles follow well-defined trajectories
and are never in two places at once. This theory is Bohmian mechanics, a.k.a. de Broglie-Bohm
pilot wave theory.
Ontology: (I) universal wave function Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
(II) particles with positions #–x k(t) and velocities
#–v k(t)
Laws: (I) Schro¨dinger equation (1)
(II) guidance equation (2)
From (1) and (2), one can derive an expression for the acceleration of each particle,
mj
#–a j(t) = − #–∇j
[
Q( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) + V (
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
]
, (3)
where Q( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) is the quantum potential, defined by
Q( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) =
∑
k
−~2
2mk
(∇2k|Ψ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t)|
|Ψ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t)|
)
. (4)
Since the focus of this paper is not on Everettian or Bohmian quantum mechanics, I’ve sought
to present each as simply as possible. The best way to formulate each theory—ontology and
laws—is a matter of current debate.
3 Prodigal QM
As a precursor to the theory I’ll propose, consider the following interpretation of quantum
mechanics which has both a many-worlds and a Bohmian flavor. The wave function always
obeys the Schro¨dinger equation. There are many different worlds, although a finite number, each
represented by a point in configuration space2. There are more worlds where |Ψ|2 is large and
less where it is small. Each world is guided by the single universal wave function in accordance
with the Bohmian guidance equation and thus each world follows a Bohmian trajectory through
configuration space. Let’s call this ontologically extravagant theory Prodigal QM.3 Why include
a multitude of worlds when we only ever observe one, our own? We could simplify the theory by
removing all of the worlds but one, arriving at Bohmian mechanics (Valentini, 2010, §7). But,
less obviously, it turns out that there is another route to simplification: keep the multitude of
worlds but remove the wave function. This option will be explored in the next section.
According to Prodigal QM, the universe contains a wave function Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) on config-
uration space and a large number of worlds which can be represented as points moving around
2The location of a single particle is given by a point in space, ( #–x ). The locations of all particles are given by
a point in configuration space, ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ...), where
#–x i is the location of particle i.
3With a continuous infinity of worlds, Prodigal QM is mentioned in Valentini (2010, §7) and in Barrett (1999)
(in Barrett’s terminology, it is a Bohmian many-threads theory in which all of the threads are taken to be
completely real); a closely related proposal is discussed in Dorr (2009).
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in configuration space. The arrangement of the worlds in configuration space is described by a
number density, ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t), normalized so that integrating ρ over all of configuration space
gives one,
∫
d3x1d
3x2... ρ = 1. Integrating ρ(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) over a not-too-small volume of config-
uration space gives the proportion of all of the worlds that happen to be in that volume at t.
By hypothesis, worlds are initially distributed so that
ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) = |Ψ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t)|2 . (5)
The velocities of the particles are described by a collection of velocity fields indexed by particle
number, k,
#–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) =
~
mk
Im
[
#–∇kΨ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t)
Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
]
, (6)
In Prodigal QM, if there is a world at ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ...) at t the velocity of the kth particle in that
world is #–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t).
4 With these velocity fields, the equivariance property of the Bohmian
guidance equation (2) ensures that ρ is always equal to |Ψ|2 if it ever is (see Du¨rr et al. , 1992,
§3).
Ontology: (I) universal wave function Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
(II) particles in many worlds described by a world density ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) and velocity
fields #–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
Laws: (I) Schro¨dinger equation (1)
(II) guidance equation (6)5
The use of densities and velocity fields is familiar from fluid dynamics. A quick review will be
helpful. Consider a fluid composed of N point particles which each have mass m. The number
density of these particles is n( #–x , t), normalized so that
∫
d3x1d
3x2... n = N . The mass density
is m×n( #–x , t). Integrating n( #–x , t) over a not-too-small volume gives the number of particles in
that volume at t. Whereas n( #–x , t) gives the density of particles in three-dimensional space, ρ
gives the density of worlds in configuration space. The velocity field for the fluid is #–u ( #–x , t),
defined as the mean velocity of particles near #–x at t.6 For an inviscid compressible fluid with
4This is not true for Newtonian QM (see §5).
5Actually, the second dynamical law is more specific than (6) since it requires not just that the velocity fields
obey (6) but that each world follows an exact Bohmian trajectory (see §5). The connection between ρ and Ψ in
(5), though not a dynamical law, might best be thought of as a third law of Prodigal QM.
6More precisely, the number density and velocity field provide a good description of the particle trajectories
if to a good approximation: n( #–x , t) gives the average number of particles in a small-but-not-too-small region R
centered about #–x over a short-but-not-too-short period of time T around t divided by the volume of R, and
#–u ( #–x , t) gives the average velocities of the particles in R over T . For more detail, see Chapman & Cowling (1970,
§2.2). The connection between ρ and the #–v ks and the trajectories of individual worlds could be spelled out along
similar lines, but full rigor in the context of Newtonian QM would require a better understanding of the dynamics
(see §5 and Hall et al. , 2014).
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zero vorticity, the time evolution of n and #–u are determined by a continuity equation
∂n( #–x , t)
∂t
= − #–∇ ·
(
n ( #–x , t) #–u ( #–x , t)
)
, (7)
and a Newtonian force law
m #–a ( #–x , t) = − #–∇
[
p( #–x , t)
n( #–x , t)
+ V ( #–x , t)
]
, (8)
where V is the external potential, p is the pressure, and
#–a ( #–x , t) =
D #–u ( #–x , t)
Dt
=
(
#–u ( #–x , t) · #–∇
)
#–u ( #–x , t) +
∂ #–u ( #–x , t)
∂t
. (9)
The acceleration is given by the material derivative of #–u not the partial derivative because a
particle’s position in the fluid is time dependent.
The three quantum theories on the table thus far are applied to the double-slit experiment
in figure 1. In the bottom-right diagram is Everettian QM where the universe is just a wave
function. The particle’s wave function is initially peaked at the two slits and then spreads out
and interferes as time progresses. When the particle hits the detector, a multitude of worlds
will separate via decoherence and in each the particle will be observed hitting at a particular
point on the screen. In Bohmian mechanics, one adds to the wave function an actual particle
which follows a definite trajectory in accordance with the guidance equation. In Prodigal QM,
there is a wave function and a collection of worlds, each of which contains a particle following a
Bohmian trajectory. In Newtonian QM, which will be introduced at the end of §4, one retains
the multitude of worlds but removes the wave function.
4 Removing the Wave Function
One can derive an equation for the dynamics of particles in Prodigal QM that makes no refer-
ence to the wave function. Once this is done, we can formulate an alternate theory where the
superfluous wave function has been removed. This new theory, Newtonian QM, will be the focus
of the remainder of the article. The mathematical manipulations presented in this section are
familiar from discussions of Bohmian mechanics, but take on a different meaning as derivations
of particle dynamics in Prodigal QM. Those who wish to skip the derivation should simply note
that (16) is derivable from (1), (5), and (6).
As ρ = |Ψ|2 (5), the wave function can be written in terms of the world-density and a phase
factor as
Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) =
√
ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)e
iθ( #–x 1,
#–x 2,...,t) . (10)
Plugging (10) into the guidance equation (6) generates
#–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) =
~
mk
#–∇kθ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ..., t) , (11)
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Prodigal QM Newtonian QM
Bohmian QM Everettian QM
Figure 1: Diagrams of the evolution of a single particle in the double-slit experiment according
to four different no-collapse theories. The vertical axis gives the position of the single particle
and the horizontal axis time. |Ψ|2 is shown as a contour plot and particle trajectories as lines.
relating #–v k and θ. (At this point, I will stop repeating the arguments of Ψ, ρ, θ, and
#–v k; they
all depend on the configuration of particles and the time.)
The evolution of the wave function Ψ is given by the Schro¨dinger equation (1). Dividing both
sides of (1) by Ψ and using (10), one can derive that
i~
2ρ
∂ρ
∂t
− ~∂θ
∂t
=
∑
k
−~2
2mk
[∇2k√ρ√
ρ
+
2i√
ρ
(
#–∇k√ρ
)
·
(
#–∇kθ
)
+ i∇2kθ −
∣∣∣ #–∇kθ∣∣∣2]+ V . (12)
Equating the imaginary parts, using (11), yields
∂ρ
∂t
= −
∑
k
#–∇k · (ρ #–v k) , (13)
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a continuity equation similar to (7). Equating the real parts of (12), using (11), yields
∂θ
∂t
=
∑
k
{
~
2mk
∇2k
√
ρ√
ρ
− mk
2~
| #–v k|2
}
− V
~
. (14)
Acting with ~mj
#–∇j on both sides of (14) and rearranging, making use of (11) and the fact that
#–a j =
∑
k
( #–v k · #–∇k) #–v j + ∂
#–v j
∂t
(15)
gives
mj
#–a j = − #–∇j
[∑
k
−~2
2mk
(∇2k√ρ√
ρ
)
+ V
]
. (16)
We have derived an equation of motion of the form F = ma, similar to both (3) and (8).7 The
last term in the brackets gives the classical potential energy of the configuration of particles and
makes no reference to the other worlds. The other term looks like an interaction between the
worlds. This term is the quantum potential Q familiar from Bohmian mechanics (4), with |Ψ|
replaced by
√
ρ.
Within Prodigal QM, we’ve seen that one can derive an equation which determines the
dynamics for all of the particles in all of the worlds without ever referencing the wave function.
(16) gives a way of calculating the acceleration of a particle that doesn’t mention Ψ, as (6) does,
but only depends on the density of worlds ρ and the potential V . In Prodigal QM, this equation
is derived, not part of the statement of the theory in the previous section. But, what if we took
it to be the primary equation of motion for the particles? One can remove the wave function
from Prodigal QM leaving only the corresponding ρ and #–v ks. So long as one enforces (16), the
dynamics for particles will be essentially as they were in Prodigal QM.
Now we can formulate a new theory: Newtonian QM. Reality consists of a large but finite
number of worlds whose distribution in configuration space is described by ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t). The
velocities of the particles in the worlds are described by the velocity fields #–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t). The
dynamical law for the velocity fields is (16), a Newtonian force law. As the particles move, the
resultant shift in the distribution ρ is determined by (13). According to Newtonian QM, quantum
mechanics is nothing but the Newtonian mechanics of particles in many different worlds.
Ontology: (I) particles in many worlds described by a world density ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
and velocity fields #–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
Law: (I) Newtonian force law (16)8
Comparing this statement of Newtonian QM to the formulation of Bohmian mechanics in
§2, Newtonian QM is arguably the simpler theory. The theory has a single dynamical law and
7This is the multi-particle version of Wyatt (2005, eq. 1.7); Holland (2005, eq. 4.9).
8The continuity equation (13), although used alongside (16) to calculate the dynamics, is not here considered
a dynamical law since it merely encodes the fact that worlds are neither created nor destroyed. As is mentioned
in §6, the Quantization Condition might be considered a non-dynamical law.
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the fundamental ontology consists only of particles. However, this quick verdict could certainly
be contested, especially in light of the discussion below: (16) is not a fundamental law (§5); an
unnatural restriction must be put on the space of states (§6); there are multiple ways to precisify
ontology of the theory (§11).
5 The Continuum Approximation
Since the number of worlds is taken to be finite, the actual distribution of worlds will be highly
discontinuous; some locations in configuration space will contain worlds and others will not. Still,
we can use a smooth density function ρ to describe the distribution of worlds well enough at a
coarse-grained level (see footnote 6). The velocity field #–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ...) gives the mean velocity
of the k-th particle in worlds near ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ...), but the k-th particle in a world at (
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ...)
may have a somewhat different velocity from #–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ...). So, in Newtonian QM worlds will
typically only approximately follow Bohmian trajectories through configuration space just as
fluid particles do not exactly follow pathlines.9
In fluid dynamics, the use of a description of the fluid in terms of n and #–u is justified by the
fact that we can calculate the dynamics of these coarse-grained properties (and others) without
needing to know exactly what all the particles are doing. Also, it is the coarse-grained properties
that we measure (Batchelor, 1967, §1.2; Chapman & Cowling, 1970, §5). What justifies the use
of ρ and the #–v ks to describe the collection of worlds? As it turns out, we can calculate the
dynamics of these properties without worrying about the exact locations of worlds via (13) and
(16). Once the evolution of ρ and the #–v ks are known, we can use ρ(t) to get probabilities (§9)
and the #–v k(t)s to determine pathlines (showing that particles follow Bohmian trajectories).
The equation of motion for the theory (16) treats the collection of worlds as a continuum. It
fails to be a fundamental law since it does not describe the precise evolution of each world and is
not valid if there are too few worlds to be well-described as a continuum. Slight deviations from
standard quantum mechanical behavior should be expected due to the fact that there are only
a finite number of worlds; worse deviations the fewer worlds there are. Future experiments may
observe such deviations and support Newtonian QM. As textbook quantum mechanics works well,
we have reason to believe there are a very large number of worlds. (The situation here is similar
to that of spontaneous collapse theories, which are in principle empirically testable.) Ultimately,
the quantum contribution to the force in (16) should be derivable from a more fundamental
inter-world interaction. One should be able to calculate the forces when there are only a handful
of worlds. Hopefully future research will explain how the continuum approximation arises from a
“micro-dynamics” of worlds just as fluid dynamics arises from the micro-dynamics of molecules.
For some progress in this direction, see Hall et al. (2014).
9A pathline gives the trajectory of a particle always traveling at the mean velocity #–u .
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6 Reintroducing the Wave Function
In §4 we saw that for any wave function Ψ(t) obeying the Schro¨dinger equation, there exists a
world-density ρ(t) and a collection of velocity fields #–v k(t) obeying (16) such that the relations
between Ψ, ρ, and the #–v ks expressed in (5) and (6) are satisfied at all times. The converse does
not hold. There are some combinations of ρ and the #–v ks, that is, some ways the universe might
be according to Newtonian QM, that do not correspond to any wave function. In general, we’ll
restrict our attention to combinations of ρ and the #–v ks that can be derived from a wave function
via (5) and (6) as it is these states which reproduce the predictions of quantum physics. For such
states, it may be useful to introduce a wave function, Ψ, even though it is not a fundamental
entity and does not appear in the equation of motion of the theory (16). The wave function
serves as a convenient way of summarizing information about the positions and velocities of
particles in the various worlds; the magnitude encodes the density of worlds (5) and the phase
encodes the velocities of particles (11). The wave function need not be mentioned in stating the
theory or (in principle) for deriving empirical predictions, but introducing a wave function is
useful for making contact with standard treatments of quantum mechanics.
As was just mentioned, there are some states of the universe in Newtonian QM that do not
correspond to quantum wave functions.10 That is, there are some combinations of ρ and the
#–v ks for which one cannot find a wave function Ψ that satisfies (5) and (6). The amplitude of Ψ
follows straightforwardly from ρ, but not every set of velocity fields #–v k can be expressed as
~
mk
times the gradient of a phase (11). For this to be the case, we must impose a constraint on the
velocity fields.11
Quantization Condition Integrating the momenta of the particles along any closed loop in
configuration space gives a multiple of Planck’s constant, h = 2pi~.∮ {∑
k
[
mk
#–v k · d #–` k
]}
= nh . (17)
If the Quantization Condition is satisfied initially, (16) ensures that it will be satisfied at all
times.
To see one sort of constraint this requirement imposes, think about the following case: a
single electron orbiting a hydrogen nucleus in the n = 2, l = 1, m = 1 energy eigenstate. For
simplicity, take the nucleus to provide an external potential and the universe to contain many
worlds with a single electron in each. The electron’s wave function is
Ψ2,1,1(r, θ, φ) =
−1
8
√
a5pi
e
−r
2a eiφr sin θ , (18)
10This point was made concisely by Wallstrom (1994) in the context of quantum hydrodynamics; it was noted
earlier by Takabayasi (1952); see also Holland (2005, eq. 4.14).
11This is loosely analogous to the constraint on the fluid velocity field #–u that it be irrotational (everywhere
zero vorticity) which is required to introduce a velocity potential (and for the validity of (8)).
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where a is the Bohr radius. The guidance equation tells us that the particle in each world
executes a circle around the z-axis with velocity vφ =
~
mrsinθ , entirely in the φ̂ direction (here
φ is the azimuthal angle). (17) is trivially satisfied since m~mrsinθ × 2pirsinθ = h. But, if the
electrons were circling the z-axis a bit faster or a bit slower the integral wouldn’t turn out right
and (17) wouldn’t be satisfied; they could orbit twice as fast but not 1.5 times as fast.
Without the Quantization Condition, Newtonian QM has too large a space of states. There
are ways the universe might be that are quantum mechanical and others that are not. It is
easy to specify what universes should be excluded, those that violate (17), but hard to give a
principled reason why those states should be counted as un-physical, improbable, or otherwise
ignorable. For now, I think it is best to understand the Quantization Condition as an empirically
discovered feature of the current state of the universe, or equivalently, of the initial conditions.
However, one might prefer to think of it as a non-dynamical law. A better explanation of the
Quantization Condition’s satisfaction would help strengthen Newtonian QM as it might seem
that the best possible explanation of the condition’s satisfaction is the existence of a wave
function (backtracking to Prodigal QM). In the remainder of the article I will assume that the
Quantization Condition is satisfied.
Suppose the world density and the velocity fields at a time are given. Provided the Quan-
tization Condition is satisfied, there exists a wave function satisfying (5) and (6). But, is it
unique?12 That is, can (5) and (6) be used to define Ψ in terms of ρ and the #–v ks?
13 First
consider the case where ρ is everywhere nonzero. The magnitude of Ψ can be derived from (5),
and (11) gives the phase up to a global constant. The wave function can be determined up to a
global phase. This would be insufficient if the overall phase mattered, but as the global phase
is arbitrary this gives exactly what we need. Actually, it’s even better this way. The fact that
the dynamics don’t care about the overall phase is explained in Newtonian QM by the fact that
changes in the global phase of the wave function don’t change the state of the universe; that is,
they don’t change ρ or the #–v ks.
If the region in which ρ 6= 0 is not connected, the wave function is not uniquely determined
by ρ and the #–v ks—one can introduce arbitrary phase differences between the separate regions.
As an example of the breakdown of uniqueness, consider the second energy eigenstate of a single
particle in a one-dimensional infinite square well of length L. In this case the wave function is
ψa(x) =
√
2
L
sin
(
2pix
L
)
. (19)
12Here the question is considered at the level of the continuum description. Because there are multiple ways
of coarse-graining, there will be multiple not-too-different ρs and #–v ks that well-describe any finite collection of
worlds and thus many wave functions. It may be that some ways of coarse-graining avoid the problems raised
below by ensuring that the velocity fields are always well-defined. If they do, the derivability of Ψ from ρ and
the #–v ks comes at the cost of limiting the wave functions one can recover, losing those in (18), (19), and (21).
13See also the discussion in Holland (2005, §4).
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This describes a universe with ρ and #–v given by
ρ(x) =
2
L
sin2
(
2pix
L
)
#–v (x) =
 0 if x 6= L2undefined if x = L2 . (20)
The velocity field #–v is undefined where there are no worlds. These expressions for ρ and #–v are
also compatible with14
ψb(x) =
√
2
L
∣∣∣∣sin(2pixL
)∣∣∣∣ . (21)
This exposes an inconvenient indeterminism: The time evolution of ψa is trivial as it is an
energy eigenstate. Since ψb is not differentiable at L/2, its time evolution cannot be calculated
straightforwardly using the Schro¨dinger equation (1). As (5) and (6) do not determine which
wave function is to be used to describe the state in (20), it is not clear how the state will evolve.
The future evolution of the universe is not uniquely determined by the instantaneous state (20),
the continuity equation (13), and the equation of motion (16). This indeterminacy arises because
ρ is zero and the velocity field is undefined at L/2, so ∂ρ∂t and
#–a are undefined at L/2. There is
reason to think this indeterminism is an artifact of the continuum approximation where (13) and
(16) need the velocity fields to be well-defined at every point in configuration space—even where
there are no worlds—to yield a unique time evolution. The fundamental dynamics should take
as input a specification of the position of each world in configuration space and the velocities of
the particles in those worlds, all of which will be well-defined (§5).
Consider a slightly different problem from that just considered: Suppose one would would
like to find a wave function Ψ(t) which describes a history of ρ(t) and the #–v k(t)s, satisfying (13)
and (16) over some time interval. There will be a collection of wave functions which satisfy (5)
and (6) at each time. For any such wave function, one can multiply it by a spatially homogeneous
time-dependent phase factor, eif(t), to get another wave function which always satisfies (5) and
(6). (The global phase at each time is arbitrary and (5) and (6) do nothing to stop you from
picking whatever global phase you’d like at each time.) In general, some of these wave functions
will satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation (1) and others will not. To constrain the time-dependence
14The wave function ψb has the disreputable property of not being smooth. It should be noted that there exist
pairs of distinct smooth non-analytic wave functions which agree on ρ and #–v at a time. (Thanks to Gordon Belot
for suggesting an example like this.) For example,
ψα(x) =

Ce
−1
1−(x+2)2 if − 3 < x < −1
−Ce
−1
1−(x−2)2 if 1 < x < 3
0 else
ψβ(x) = |ψα(x)| .
12
of the phase when using a wave function to describe histories, (14) can be imposed as a third
link between the wave function and the particles (in addition to (5) and (6)). Because (5), (6),
(13), and (14) hold, the wave function must obey the Schro¨dinger equation.
This section began with the observation that there are states in Newtonian QM that cannot
be described by a wave function. However, these can be excised by imposing the Quantization
Condition. Given a state that can be described by a wave function, one might hope that this
wave function would be unique. Sometimes it is not. A wave function aptly describes a state in
Newtonian QM at a time if (5) and (6) are satisfied. But, if these are the only constraints, a
history in Newtonian QM can always be described by many wave functions. So, there is freedom
to add a third connection between the wave function and the particles. Imposing (14) proves
a convenient choice as it guarantees that the wave function obeys the Schro¨dinger equation—a
desirable feature since the point of introducing a wave function was to clarify the connection
between Newtonian QM and standard treatments of quantum mechanics.
Because a wave function can be introduced to describe the world density and the velocity
fields, one is free to use well-known techniques to calculate the time evolution of the wave
function and use that to determine how the world density and velocity fields evolve. However,
there is evidence that it is sometimes easier to use the trajectories of worlds to calculate the time
evolution (Wyatt, 2005; Hall et al. , 2014).
7 Probability: Versus Everettian Quantum Mechanics
The Born Rule is easier to justify in Newtonian QM than in the many-worlds interpretation. In
Everettian QM, there is dispute over how one can even make sense of assigning probabilities to
measurement outcomes when the way the universe will branch is deterministic and known (the
incoherence problem). There is also the quantitative problem of why the Born Rule probabilities
are the right ones to assign. Recent derivations tend to appeal to complex decision-theoretic
arguments, which, although they may ultimately be successful, are not uncontroversially accepted
(Saunders et al. , 2010). Things look worrisome because there are some prima facie plausible
ways of counting agents which yield the result that the vast majority of agents see relative
frequencies of experimental outcomes which deviate significantly from those predicted by the
Born Rule (although the total amplitude-squared weight of the branches in which agents see
anomalous statistics is small). Newtonian QM does not run into similar problems since the
number of worlds in a particular region of configuration space is always proportional to |Ψ|2.
At any time, most agents are in high amplitude regions. So, in typical measurement scenarios,
most agents will see long-run frequencies which agree with the predictions of the Born Rule.
Were a proponent of Prodigal QM to claim similar advantages over Everettian QM, one
could reasonably object that the Born Rule is recovered only because it was put in by hand. In
Prodigal QM, (5) is an additional postulate. In Newtonian QM, it is not. The density of worlds
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is given by |Ψ|2 because Ψ is definitionally related to the density of worlds by (5) (see §6). The
wave function is, after all, not fundamental but a mere description of ρ and the #–v ks.
8 Probability: Versus Bohmian Mechanics
Although it is widely agreed that the Born Rule can be justified in Bohmian mechanics, there
is disagreement about how exactly the story should go. In this section I will briefly discuss
three ways of justifying the Born Rule in Bohmian mechanics and then argue that Newtonian
QM can give a cleaner story. First, though, note an important similarity between the two
theories. According to Newtonian QM each world follows an approximately Bohmian path
through configuration space. So if you think that worlds in which particles follow Bohmian
trajectories are able to reproduce the results of familiar quantum experiments, you should think
worlds in Newtonian QM can too.
In Bohmian mechanics, not all initial conditions reproduce the statistical predictions of quan-
tum mechanics. That is, not all specifications of the initial wave function Ψ(0) and particle con-
figuration ( #–x 1(0),
#–x 2(0), ...) yield a universe in which experimenters would see long-run statistics
of measurements on subsystems which agree with the predictions of the Born Rule. Why should
we expect to be in one of the universes with Born Rule statistics? One way to respond to this
problem is to add a postulate to the theory which ensures that ensembles of particles in the
universe will (or almost certainly will) display Born Rule statistics upon measurement (e.g.,
Holland, 1993, §3.6.3). A second option is to argue that typical universes are such that Born
Rule frequencies will be observed when measurements are made (Du¨rr et al. , 1992). To say that
such results are “typically” observed is to say that: for any initial wave function Ψ(0), the vast
majority of initial particle configurations reproduce Born Rule statistics. Speaking of the “vast
majority” of initial configurations only makes sense relative to a way of measuring the size of
regions of configuration space; here the measure used is given by |Ψ|2. A third option: one could
argue that many initial states will start to display Born Rule statistics sufficiently rapidly that,
since we are not at the beginning of the universe, we should expect to see Born Rule frequencies
now even if such frequencies were not displayed in the distant past (Valentini & Westman, 2005).
Each of these proposals faces challenges. The additional postulates which might be added
to the theory look ad hoc. The measure used to determine typicality must be satisfactorily
justified.15 The desirable evolution of states described in the third option has only been demon-
strated in relatively simple cases. Also, there will certainly exist initial conditions that do not
come to display Born Rule statistics sufficiently rapidly and these must somehow be excluded.
To the extent that one finds these objections to Bohmian strategies worrisome, it is an advantage
15For a statement of the objection, see Dickson (1998, §5.4). For a variety of reasons to regard the measure as
natural, see Goldstein & Struyve (2007).
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of the new theory that it avoids them.
Although Newtonian QM, like Bohmian mechanics, permits a particular world to have a
history of measurement results where the frequencies of outcomes do not match what one would
expect from the Born Rule, it is impossible for the density of worlds to deviate from |Ψ|2. So, in
light of the results in Du¨rr et al. (1992), it will always be the case that Born Rule statistics are
observed in the vast majority of worlds in any universe of Newtonian QM. Since we’re not sure
which world we are in, we should expect to be in one in which Born Rule statistics are observed.
9 Probability: Newtonian QM
If the universe’s evolution is deterministic and the initial state is known, what is there left for
an agent to assign probabilities to? There is no incoherence problem in Newtonian QM since,
given the state of the universe, one is generally uncertain which of the many distinct worlds
one is in. There will always be many possibilities consistent with one’s immediate experiences.
The uncertainty present here is self-locating uncertainty (see Lewis, 1979). Of course, there will
generally also be uncertainty about the state of the universe.
On to the quantitative problem:16 Given a particular distribution of worlds ρ and set of
velocity fields #–v k, that is, given a specification of the state of the universe, one ought to assign
equal credence to being in any of the worlds consistent with one’s evidence.17 Because there are
only a finite number worlds, this advice is unambiguous. As it turns out, this basic indifference
principle suffices to derive the correct quantum probabilities. Consider an idealized case in which
the agent knows the world density and the velocity fields, and knows that there is an agent in
each of these worlds having experiences indistinguishable from her own. In this case, the above
indifference principle tells her to assign probabilities to being in different regions of configuration
space in accordance with ρ. Since ρ = |Ψ|2, she must assign credences in accordance with |Ψ|2
and thus in agreement with the Born Rule. Next, suppose this agent learns the outcome of an
experiment. Then she ought to assign zero credence to the worlds inconsistent with her evidence
and reapportion that credence among those which remain (keeping the probability of each non-
eliminated world equal). This updating is analogous to learning which branch you are on after
a measurement in Everettian QM.
In general, the probability agent S ought to assign to her own world having property A,
16See also the discussion in Bostro¨m (2012, §2.4).
17This follows from a more general epistemic principle defended in Elga (2004).
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conditional on a particular state of the universe at a certain time, is
Pr
(
A
∣∣ρ, #–v 1, #–v 2, ...) = # of worlds with property A and a copy of S
# of worlds with a copy of S
=
∫
dVAS ρ(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ...)∫
dVS ρ(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ...)
=
∫
dVAS |Ψ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ...)|2∫
dVS |Ψ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ...)|2
. (22)
Here A could be something like, “the pointer indicates 7” or “the particle just fired will hit in
the third band of the interference pattern.” The volume VS delimits the set of worlds, specified
by a region of configuration space, compatible with S’s data. Worlds in this region are such that
previous experiments had the outcomes S remembers them having, macroscopic arrangements
of particles match what S currently observes, and some person is having the same conscious
experiences as S.18 The volume VAS gives the set of worlds compatible with S’s data in which
A holds.19 These conditional probabilities can be used to test hypotheses about ρ and the #–v ks
and thus to learn about the state of the universe (not just one’s own world) from experience.
10 Continuous Infinity or Mere Multitude of Worlds?
So far, we have taken ρ to describe the distribution of a large but finite number of worlds. But,
one might be tempted to defend a variant of Newtonian QM in which there are a continuous
infinity of worlds, one at every point at which ρ is non-zero. This causes trouble. The meaning of
ρ becomes unclear if we move to a continuous infinity of worlds since we can no longer understand
ρ as yielding the proportion of all worlds in a given volume of configuration space upon integration
over that volume. There would be infinite worlds in any finite volume (where ρ 6= 0) and infinite
total worlds. If ρ doesn’t give the proportion of worlds in a region, it is unclear why epistemic
agents should apportion credences as recommended in the previous section. So, the continuous
variant, if sense can be made of it, faces the quantitative probability problem head on.
As discussed in §5, the dynamical law proposed for Newtonian QM (16) is not fundamental.
If it somehow turns out that we cannot view the force caused by the quantum potential as
arising from an interaction between individual worlds, this would provide a reason to accept a
continuous infinity of quantum worlds over a mere multitude. It might appear to be a strength
of the continuous variant that its laws can already be precisely stated, but I expect that this
advantage will evaporate when possible fundamental interactions are formulated for the discrete
variant. The continuous variant does have a serious advantage: the continuum approximation
(§5) is no approximation. Particles will unerringly follow Bohmian trajectories.
18For simplicity, I have neglected the possibility that S’s memories or current observations are deceptive.
19Note that the boundaries of VS and VAS will often depend on ρ and the
#–v ks.
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11 Ontology
According to Newtonian QM, what the universe contains is a finite collection of worlds. There are
at least two ways to precisify this idea. First, one might take configuration space to be the fun-
damental space, inhabited by point-particles (worlds). Second, one might take the fundamental
space to be ordinary three-dimensional space, inhabited by particles in different worlds.
According to the first picture, on the fundamental level, the universe is 3N -dimensional and
contains a large number of point particles, each of which has dynamics so complex that it merits
the name of “world” or “world-particle.” Forces between these world-particles are Newtonian
and the dynamics are local. Here Newtonian QM is a theory of the Newtonian dynamics of a
fluid of world-particles in 3N -dimensional space. Albert (1996) has argued that the one world of
Bohmian mechanics can be understood as a world-particle which moves around in configuration
space guided by the wave function. He provides a way of explaining how the appearance of
a three-dimensional world arises from the motion of this world-particle which applies mutatis
mutandis to Newtonian QM in which there are more world-particles executing the same old
Bohmian dances.
On the second picture there are particles interacting in three-dimensional space, nothing
more.20 Space is very densely packed with particles, but not all particles are members of the
same world. Some particles are members of world #1, some of world #2, etc. What world
a particle belongs to might be a primitive property, like its mass or charge. The equation of
motion for a particle in world #827, (16), says that the force from the potential V depends
only on the positions of the other particles in world #827. However, the quantum potential
introduces an inter-world force whereby particles that are not members of world #827 can still
impact the trajectory of a particle in this world. So, particles which happen to be members
of the same world interact in one way, whereas particles which are members of different worlds
interact another way.
In the many-worlds interpretation, one must tell a somewhat complicated story about how
people and quantum worlds arise as emergent entities in the time-evolving quantum state (e.g.,
Wallace, 2003). This story may not be successful. It might be the case that wave functions
evolving in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation are incapable of supporting life or at least
lives that feel like ours (Maudlin, 2010). If that’s right, Newtonian QM has a potential advantage.
On the second ontological picture, people are built from particles in the usual way. On the first
ontological picture, there is a story about emergence that must be told but the details of the
story are very different from the Everettian one and it succeeds or fails independently.
If, on the other hand, the Everettian story about emergence is successful, then Bohmian
mechanics (as formulated here) faces the Everett-in-denial objection (Deutsch, 1996; Brown &
20This second option resembles the novel ontology for the many-worlds interpretation proposed by Allori et al.
(2011).
17
Wallace, 2005; Valentini, 2010). Both Everettian QM and Bohmian mechanics contain in their
fundamental ontology a wave function which always obeys the Schro¨dinger equation. If such a
wave function is sufficient for there to be creatures experiencing what appears upon not-too-
close inspection to be a classical world, then Bohmian mechanics, like Everettian QM, includes
agents who see every possible outcome of a quantum measurement. If the Everettian story about
emergence works and the Everett-in-denial objection against Bohmian mechanics is successful,
then Newtonian QM has a serious advantage over Bohmian mechanics. Newtonian QM cannot
be accused of being a many worlds theory in disguise since the theory embraces its many worlds
ontology.
12 Symmetries: Time Reversal and Galilean Boosts
Newtonian QM can help us understand symmetry transformations in quantum mechanics. First,
consider time reversal. Albert (2000) proposes an intuitive and general account of time reversal
symmetry in physical theories which judges QM, in all of its familiar precisifications, to fail
to be time-reversal invariant. A deterministic physical theory specifies which sequences of in-
stantaneous states are allowed and which are forbidden through dynamical laws. If the laws
allow the time-reversed history of instantaneous states for any allowed history of instantaneous
states, then the theory is deemed time-reversal invariant. In theories like Bohmian mechanics
or Everettian QM, the instantaneous state includes the wave function at a time Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
and a complete history includes the wave function at all times. The time reverse of the his-
tory is Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ...,−t). Ψ( #–x 1, #–x 2, ...,−t) will not necessarily satisfy the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion whenever Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) does—so quantum mechanics is judged not to be time-reversal
invariant. However, Ψ∗( #–x 1, #–x 2, ...,−t) will always satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation whenever
Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) does (standard textbook accounts take this to be the time reversed history and
thus judge the theory to be time-reversal invariant).
In Newtonian QM, it is straightforward to show that time reversing the history of parti-
cle trajectories amounts to changing the history of the wave function from Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) to
Ψ∗( #–x 1, #–x 2, ...,−t). The instantaneous state of the world is specified by giving the locations (but
not the velocities) of all of the particles in all of the worlds. The time reversal operation thus takes
the history ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) and
#–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) to ρ(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ...,−t) and − #–v k( #–x 1, #–x 2, ...,−t).
By (11), flipping the phase generates a wave function which describes the flipped velocities of
particles in the time-reversed history. The complex conjugation in the textbook time reversal
operation for quantum mechanics can be explained as deriving from a reversal in the velocities
of the particles.
Newtonian QM is time-reversal invariant according to Albert’s account. Even if one doesn’t
agree with Albert’s account of time-reversal invariance, it is a virtue of this theory over others
that it can give a simple explanation of why the wave function transforms in the textbook way
18
under time-reversal.
Next, consider Galilean boosts. In a similar spirit to Albert’s criticism of the standard account
of time-reversal, one could argue that quanrtum mechanics is not invariant under Galilean boosts
since the equations of motion are not generally obeyed when we take Ψ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) to Ψ(
#–x 1−
#–wt, #–x 2 − #–wt, ..., t).21 The invariance of quantum mechanics under Galilean boosts is sometimes
demonstrated by showing that, for certain potentials, there exists a transformation of the state
which appropriately shifts the probability density and guarantees satisfaction of the Schro¨dinger
equation (e.g., Ballentine, 1998, §4.3). Under a boost by #–w, the wave function is supposed to
transform as
Ψ0(~x1,
#–x 2, ..., t)
#–w−→ Ψ(~x1, #–x 2, ..., t) = e i~
∑
k {mk #–w · #–x k− 12mk| #–w |2t}Ψ0( #–x 1 − #–wt, #–x 2 − #–wt, ..., t) .
(23)
It’s interesting that there exists a transformation which moves probability densities in the right
way and guarantees that the Schro¨dinger equation is invariant under boosts, but it is unclear why
this particular transformation is the one that really represents Galilean boosts. In Newtonian
QM this transformation of the wave function results from boosting the velocities of all of the
particles in all of the worlds.
Adding #–w to the velocity of each particle transforms the original density ρ0(t) and the original
velocity fields #–v 0k(t) to
ρ( #–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) = ρ0(
#–x 1 − #–wt, #–x 2 − #–wt, ..., t)
#–v k(
#–x 1,
#–x 2, ..., t) =
#–v 0k(
#–x 1 − #–wt, #–x 2 − #–wt, ..., t) + #–w . (24)
Suppose Ψ0(t), ρ0(t), and the
#–v 0k(t)s satisfy (5), (6), and (14); that is, Ψ0(t) describes this den-
sity and these velocity fields. Then, the new wave function Ψ(t) generated by the transformation
in (23) will satisfy (5), (6), and (14) for the ρ(t) and #–v k(t)s in (24), provided that the potential
V is translation invariant (as the reader can verify). Thus, (23) gives a general recipe for finding
a wave function which correctly describes the boosted particles.
13 Spin-1/2 Particles
There appears to be serious trouble on the horizon for this new theory. In Bohmian mechanics
spin is often treated as a property of the wave function, not the particles pushed along by it.22
So, if we remove the wave function, it looks like we’ll lose all of the information about the
spin of the system! Actually, there is a very natural way to extend Newtonian QM to a single
particle with spin. If we endow the particle with a definite spin in every world, we can recover
the standard dynamics. Here I’ll apply to Newtonian QM a strategy which has been used in
21A point made by Albert in presentations. See also Valentini (1997).
22e.g., Du¨rr & Teufel (2009, §8.4) and Albert (1994, ch. 7)
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quantum hydrodynamics and (a version of) Bohmian mechanics (see Holland, 1993, ch. 9 and
references therein).
Consider the dynamics of a single spin-1/2 particle. To our basic ontology, consisting of a
distribution of worlds ρ( #–x , t) where the particle has velocity #–v ( #–x , t) in each world, let us add
a property to the particle in each world: spin magnetic moment. The spin magnetic moment
#–u ( #–x , t) of a particle can be specified by a polar angle α( #–x , t), an azimuthal angle β( #–x , t), and
a constant µ (for an electron, µ ≈ −e~2m , where e is the magnitude of the electron’s charge).
#–µ = µ

sinα cosβ
sinα sinβ
cosα
 (25)
Alternatively, we can speak of the particle’s internal angular momentum
#–
S , which is related to
#–µ by
#–
S =
~
2µ
#–µ . (26)
With the magnetic moment in hand, we can partially define23 the spinor wave function χ from
ρ and #–µ by
χ =
 χ+
χ−
 =
 √ρ cos α2 eiθ√
ρ sin α2 e
iθ+iβ
 , (27)
similar to (10). Here the z-spin basis is used to represent the spinor.
The Bohmian guidance equation for a spin-1/2 particle is
#–v =
~
m
Im
[
χ†
#–∇χ
χ†χ
]
. (28)
Inserting the expression for χ in (27) yields
#–v =
~
m
#–∇θ + ~
m
sin2
α
2
#–∇β , (29)
similar to (11).
The Pauli equation for a spin-1/2 particle in the presence of an external magnetic field is
i~
∂
∂t
χ =
{−~2
2m
∇2 + V − µ #–B · σ
}
χ , (30)
where σ are the Pauli spin matrices. To focus on spin, the contributions to the Hamiltonian
arising because the particle has a charge (not just a magnetic moment) have been omitted. From
(27), (29), and (30) one can derive the time dependence of #–µ and #–v . The magnetic moment
vector evolves as
~
2µ
d #–µ
dt
=
~2
4mµ2ρ
#–µ × [∂a (ρ ∂a #–µ)] + #–µ × #–B
d
#–
S
dt
= #–µ × #–BTot , (31)
23This definition is only partial as θ is left unspecified.
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using the Einstein summation convention over spatial index a.24 The right hand side gives the
net torque on the particle, which arises from a quantum and a classical contribution. These
torques can be combined by defining
#–
BTot ≡ #–B + ~
2 [∂a (ρ ∂a
#–µ)]
4mµ2ρ
. (32)
The net magnetic field
#–
BTot is the sum of a classical and a quantum contribution. (31) gives
the classical dynamics for the angular momentum of a magnetic dipole in the presence of the
magnetic field
#–
BTot.
From (27), (29), and (30), it follows that the acceleration can be expressed as
m #–a = − #–∇ [Q+QP + V ] + µa #–∇BTota . (33)
This is simply the equation of motion for a particle without spin (16) with two new terms:
the classical force on a particle with magnetic moment #–µ from a magnetic field
#–
BTot and a
spin-dependent contribution to the quantum potential,
QP =
~2
8mµ2
#–µ · (∇2 #–µ) = 1
2m
#–
S ·
(
∇2 #–S
)
. (34)
As with the quantum potential Q discussed in §4, this new term represents an interaction between
worlds (as does the quantum contribution to the net magnetic field
#–
BTot). Together, the above
equations of motion for #–µ and #–v , (31) and (33), serve to define Newtonian QM for a single
spin-1/2 particle. We can omit any mention of the spinor wave function χ or the phase θ in
the fundamental laws. The equations of motion for #–µ and #–v , which govern the evolution of ρ
via (13), will guarantee that ρ, #–µ , and #–v will evolve as if they were governed by a spinor wave
function satisfying the Pauli equation, provided that the velocity field obeys a constraint like
the one imposed for spin-0 particles in §6,∮ (
m #–v − ~ sin2 α
2
#–∇β
)
· d #–` = nh . (35)
In Newtonian QM, particles have well-defined spin magnetic moments at all times. How
can the theory recover the results of standard experiments involving spin if particles are never
in superpositions of different spin states? Consider, for example, a z-spin “measuring” Stern-
Gerlach apparatus. Suppose the wave function is in a superposition z-spin up and z-spin down:
1√
2
|↑z〉 + 1√2 |↓z〉. When passed through the inhomogeneous magnetic field, the wave function
will split in two. On the standard account, the particle will be found in either the upper
region (corresponding to z-spin up) or the lower region (corresponding to z-spin down) upon
measurement with equal probability. In Newtonian QM, there is initially an ensemble of worlds,
in each of which the particle has some initial position in the wave packet and in all of which the
24Result as in Holland (1993, eq. 9.3.15). Note that different conventions are adopted for the sign of µ. (33) is
in agreement with Holland’s eq. 9.3.19, although written in a more suggestive form.
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particle’s spin magnetic moment points squarely in the x-direction. A particle in the top half
of the initial wave packet has its spin rotated to point in the z-direction as it passes through
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus (in accordance with (31)); a particle in the lower portion will end
up with spin pointing in the negative z-direction. In this theory, the Stern-Gerlach apparatus
does not measure z-spin, but instead forces particles to align their magnetic moments along the
z-axis. This is also how Stern-Gerlach measurements are interpreted in versions of Bohmian
mechanics where particles have definite spins (see Dewdney et al. , 1986; Holland, 1993, ch. 9).
14 Conclusion
An optimistic synopsis: Once we realize that Newtonian QM is a viable way of understanding
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, we see that we never needed to overthrow Newtonian me-
chanics with a quantum revolution. One can formulate quantum mechanics in terms of point
particles interacting via Newtonian forces. The mysterious wave function is merely a way of
summarizing the properties of particles, not a piece of fundamental reality.
There are a variety of reasons not to like this theory. First, there is arguably a cost associated
with the abundance of other worlds which, although detectable via their interactions with our
own world, are admittedly odd. Second, the space of states for the theory is larger than one
might like in two distinct ways: There are possible combinations of ρ and the #–v ks that do not
correspond to any wave function because the velocity fields cannot be expressed as the gradient of
a phase (§6). There are also states of the universe where the number of worlds is not sufficiently
large for the continuum description to be valid (§5). Even if there are a great many worlds,
slight divergence from the predictions of standard quantum mechanics is to be expected. Third,
it is a shortcoming of the current formulation of Newtonian QM that we must approximate the
actual distribution of worlds as continuous and cannot yet formulate the fundamental equation
of motion precisely for a discrete collection of worlds (§5). Finally, the theory is limited in that it
is not here extended to systems of multiple particles with spin or to relativistic quantum physics.
In addition to its seductive conservatism, I view the following comparative strengths as most
compelling. Against the many-worlds interpretation, Newtonian QM has two main advantages.
First, there is no incoherence problem or quantitative probability problem—the Born Rule can
be justified quickly from self-locating uncertainty (§7). Second, the theory avoids the need to
explain how worlds emerge from the wave function—worlds are taken to be fundamental (§11).
Compared to Bohmian mechanics, the theory is arguably simpler—it replaces an ontology of
wave functions and particles with one just containing particles (§4). Newtonian QM’s explana-
tion of why we should expect our world to reproduce Born Rule statistics is potentially more
compelling than the Bohmian stories (§8). Also, Newtonian QM is forthright about its many
worlds character, sidestepping the Everett-in-denial objection (§11).
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